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Abstract
This study presents a performance evaluation of the deployment of partitioned workflows over hybrid clouds
taking into account the cost of transfer data delay. This paper extends previous work on the cost of security
in cloud computing based on the multi-level security model. This research aims to provide performance
predictions of different deployment options in public and private clouds in terms of the computation and
communication costs. The Markovian process algebra PEPA is used to evaluate the models behaviour under
different scenarios.
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1 Introduction
With the growth in data generation and use many organisations tend to outsource
their data storage and analysis through the use of cloud computing to decrease
the load on their local resources and to reduce the costs of the management and
the maintenance. This is because, cloud computing provides numerous advantages
such as, scalability, less effort of data management, on demand access, pay as you go
[1,3,12]. Nonetheless, confidentiality, integrity and privacy of data are still the main
security concerns for both data owners, i.e. individuals and enterprises, and also
cloud service providers [4,5,6,16]. As reported in [11], the lack of physical control
on data results in a considerable problem regarding the security and the integrity of
the data. Consequently, several organisations tend to use federated clouds (mixing
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public and private) based on the privacy of the deployed data, where the workflows
are partitioned and deployed over the clouds.
A number of studies have considered the partitioning of workflows and the de-
ployment over clouds while meeting the security requirements, for instance, [7,13],
in order to mitigate the cloud security issues. In [13] a multi-level security model
for partitioning workflows and the deployment over federated clouds is introduced.
In our previous work [8], a cost model has been created by means of PEPA based on
the multi-level security model of [13]. Although, the developed model has explored
the costs associated with different security choices, however, we have not considered
the communications cost. Therefore, this paper aims to extend our previous models
[8] to include the data transfer cost in order to investigate the performance of two
different deployment options on public and private clouds with different transfer
costs.
This paper is structured as follows. In section 2, some background and related
work have been reviewed. Then, we describe briefly the multi-level security model
in Section 3. After that, the communications cost PEPA model is presented in
Section 4. This is followed by the illustration and discussion of the experimental
results in Section 5. The paper is concluded in Section 6 and outline some further
works.
2 Background and Related Work
Despite the important features that are associated with the use of federated clouds,
for example significantly decreasing the cost of computational support, security
breaches can arise through the flow of data between private and public clouds. A
methodology for making the access control matrices dynamic is presented by [9],
where workflows are modelled using Petri Net and security policies for read and write
access have been taken into consideration. Furthermore, in [10] the Bell-LaPadula
security conditions, i.e. no read up and no write down, are used to assign different
security levels for a formal model specified by means of Petri Nets. Our approach
has some similarity to these approaches [9,10] in using a multi-level security model
and formal modelling and analysing workflows. However, these approaches are more
concentrated on the security aspects such as control access rather than investigating
the performance cost of security in cloud computing.
Watson in [13] has presented a multi-level security model for partitioning work-
flows over hybrid clouds. The model adopts the security conditions of the Bell-
LaPadula [2] and extends them to include the cloud computing. The model of [13]
generates a collection of valid deployment options based on the sensitivity of data.
Furthermore, a tool has been developed by Wen and Watson[15] for dynamic ex-
ception handling, which extends the multi-level security model of [13]. The authors
indicate that the tool can discover alternative partitions with low-cost paths to deal
with exceptions that may occur during run time. Later, Watson and Little [14] have
extended the work further to assign security levels to services, data, platforms and
networks. Additionally, this study [14] has introduced a methodology for modelling
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the security requirements of distributed systems.
Zeng et al [17] have presented an approach for a formal verification of a secure
dynamic information flow within the federated cloud system. A model is developed
in a way that allows capturing security roles, i.e. BellLaPadula model and cloud
security; then Petri nets are used to analyse the correctness of this type of system.
Our approach adopts Watson’s multi-level security model [13] and has some simi-
larity to the research of [17], in the sense that both studies used the BellLaPadula
security model. Nevertheless, our approach is concerned with the performance anal-
ysis of a secure model, unlike the [17] which is more about security and correctness
analysis using Petri nets.
3 Multi-Level Security Model
As discussed above, an approach for partitioning workflows over clouds has been
introduced by Watson [13] based on a multi-level security model which extends
the Bell-LaPadula security model. Applications are structured as workflows parti-
tioned based on the sensitivity (i.e. privacy requirement) of data. A security level
is assigned to each service and data that are consumed and produced by services.
Also, the cloud that will accommodate the data and services is assigned a security
level. Thus the security level is used to ensure the security of transferring data and
services between the clouds (the source and the destination). For example, where
patient data will be processed through four services, read, anonymise, analyse and
write, the analyse action may require a lower level of access than read as it acts
only on anonymous data.
A tool has been developed by [13] to automatically generate the valid deploy-
ment options, which comply with the aforementioned security conditions. The tool
will rank the deployment options based on the calculation of the cost, taking into
consideration: data storage, CPU and data transfer. However, this cost calcula-
tion takes no account of load or availability of resources which would normally be
a major consideration for any performance analysis. Figure 1 illustrates the valid
deployment options 1 to 4, where the colours red and green are used to indicate the
private and the public clouds respectively. For more details about the multi-level
security model, we refer the interested reader to [13].
4 The Model
In this section we will investigate the behaviour of two valid deployment options
models (options 1 and option 4 ), as they belong to different deployment classes
(public and private). In our previous work [8] we did not model any data transfer
costs. Clearly, this can be achieved by adding some network delays between actions
being undertaken in different locations. We have made an assumption of using the
data transfer delay as an independent action, and there is no pooling for servers, i.e.
we do not consider contention for network access and therefore the transfer duration
does not depend on how many data transfer actions happen at the same time. This
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Fig. 1. Valid deployment options, where boxes red and green referring to private and public clouds respec-
tively [13]
assumprion is likely to be reasonable for internal transfers, i.e. within the public or
private cloud, but may not be valid for large data transfers between domains with
limited router or firewall capacity, or where additional authentication is required in
order to perform the data transfer.
The following is the PEPA model of option 1 (public cloud) where transferData
action is added to the model:
Service0
def
= (readData, r).Service1
Service1
def
= (anonymise, s).Service2
Service2
def
= (transferData, d).Service3
Service3
def
= (analyse, t).Service4
Service4
def
= (writeResult ,w).Service0
Private
def
= (readData, r).Private + (anonymise, s).Private
Public
def
= (analyse, t).Public + (writeResult ,w).Public
System
def
= Service0 [N ]
L
Private ‖ Public[M1]
The option 4 PEPA model (private cloud) is same as the above model except
for the following changes:
Private
def
= (readData, r).Private + (anonymise, s).Private
+ (analyse, t).Private + (writeResult ,w).Private
System
def
= Service0 [N ]
L
Private[M2]
Where for both options N = 15 to 2000, M1 = 5 to 25 and M2 = 5 to 25. Also
the cooperation set L = {readData, anonymise, analyse, writeResult}. Also, we
have used four assumptions for the data transfer delay (d = 0.001, 0.01, 0.1, 1), with
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the intention to investigate the impact that have on the model overall throughput.
Table 1 displays the rates used with the model of option 1 communications cost.
Rates
Assumption r s d t w
1 1 0.1 0.001 0.001 1
2 1 0.1 0.01 0.001 1
3 1 0.1 0.1 0.001 1
4 1 0.1 1 0.001 1
Table 1
The rates of the the option 1 communication cost model
Furthermore, the rates of the option 4 communication cost model are shown in
Table 1, except for the rate d which is set to 1, hence we assume it is 1000 times
faster than the same slow rate that used in the option 1.
5 Experiments and Results
In this section the experimental results of the option 1 and option 4 communication
cost models will be discussed. Two analyses have been used to evaluate the per-
formance of these systems. Continuous time Markov chain (CTMC) analysis gives
an exact solution of the models, but suffers from the state space explosion problem
when the number of servers or workflows are very large. Thus we also employ a fluid
approximation based on ordinary differential equations (ODEs) to provide scalable
analysis.
5.1 CTMC analysis
Figure 2 displays the throughput of option 1 and option 4 models taking into ac-
count the data transfer cost. In the case of the option 1 model the various rates
that are assigned to the action transferData, have a noticeable impact on the perfor-
mance of the model. Under assumption 1, the throughput of the model is low and
the system is saturated rapidly at 10 instances of public clouds. However, under
assumptions 2, 3 and 4, the throughput is much higher, specifically under assump-
tion 3 and 4 where the throughput is increased significantly. But the assumptions
2, 3 and 4 are saturated at exactly the same point where the system has 15 public
cloud instances, due to the liminted number of available servers.
We have assumed that the data transfer delay of the private cloud (option 4 )
will be lower than the public cloud (option 1 ) as it is only involves local commu-
nication. Therefore, the rate of transferData is assigned a relatively higher value,
which consequently has a greater impact on the throughput of the option 4 model
as shown in Figure 2. Whereas the throughput of the option 4 model is slightly
higher than the option 1 (assumption 3) and identical with the assumption 4. This
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is because the behaviour of option 4 model is limited by the overhead of the analyse
action, as it has a comparatively slow rate. Obviously, the consideration of the data
transfer cost is shown that option 4 will be a valuable choice as same as the option
1 public. However, the cost of designing and creating data center for example, and
the computational cost will be significantly higher than the option 1. Hence, even
with the use of a small rate for the transferData action in option 1, it is still offer-
ing a good performance and it is more cost effective when the number of workflow
instances and servers are relatively small.
0 5 10 15 20 25
0
0.003
0.006
0.009
0.012
0.015
Public Clouds
T
h
ro
u
g
h
p
u
t
Option1 Assump.1
Option1 Assump.2
Option1 Assump.3
Option1 Assump.4
Option4 Private
Fig. 2. The communications cost throughput of both option 1 and option 4, using rates of assumptions 1-4
of Table 1 for option 1 and the rates r = 1, s = 0.1, d = 1, t = 0.001 and w = 1 for option 4
In the Figure 3, the population of the model of the communication cost of option
1 is shown. Whereas we have only depicted the population of two most important
services (Service2 and Service3), which respectively representing the dataTransfer
and analyse actions. That is because the behaviour of the model is investigated
through varying the rate of these two actions (see Table 1). Obviously, by varying
the rate of transferData action the model behaviour has changed importantly, where
the population of Service2 is noticeably decreased and the saturation point has
changed to 15 public cloud instances, i.e. assumptions 2 and 3. On the other hand,
it is clear that the analyse action is still limiting the model performance where
the increase of the rate of Service2 is correspondingly increasing the population of
Service3, hence raise the queuing time of the analyse actions that waiting to be
processed.
As we have assumed that the rates of option 4 are comparatively fast except the
rate of Service3, the population of option 4 model in Figure 4 exhibiting that the
model performance is limited by the rate of analyse action, regardless the increase
of the number of private clouds instances, which is showing consistency with the
population of the same service of the option 1 (public) that shown in Figure 3. So,
the population of Service3 is shown as a flat line (saturated). In spite of the fact
that we have varied the rate of transfer data in option 1 and it has been fixed to
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Fig. 3. Population of the communications cost option 1 model (Service2 and Service3) by using rates of
assumptions 1–4 of Table 1
1 in the option 4, the performance of both options, however is exceedingly similar.
Consequently, in terms of the cost option 1 is still presenting better performance.
Additionally, for more clarification for the behaviour of Service2, Figure 4 is used
with two different scales to show the variation of the Service2, which is unclear
without using a small scale for the population of the Service2. Indeed, it is obvious
that the number of workflow instances that used in this section is small, where the
CTMC allows us to only analyse 15 workflows instances in parallel, therefore, the
ODEs analysis will be used to evaluate large systems.
5.2 ODEs analysis
In the following set of experiments the communication cost of the option 1 and
the option 4 PEPA models have been analysed using the ODEs analysis. Where,
the number of workflows has been varied from 20 (Figures 5 – 8) to 2000 (Figures
9 – 12) for both options and the number of public and private clouds have been
varied from 5 to 10. The main purpose of using the ODEs is to analyse the system
behaviour with a large number of workflows instances, which cannot be processed
by CTMC. Figure 5 and Figure 7, are respectively, demonstrating the performance
of option 1 model with 5 and then 10 public cloud instances. It is obvious that the
population of Service3 is decreased by only doubling the number of public clouds
from 5 to 10, and also, the model in Figure 7 reaches its steady state faster than
the Figure 5.
Figure 6 and Figure 8, depict the transient behaviour of option 4, which shows
that the fast rate of the transferData action on private clouds has made the perfor-
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Fig. 4. Population of the communications cost option 4 model Service2 and Service3
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Fig. 5. ODEs of Communication Cost Option 1
model, using assump. 2 of Table 1, t = 0.01, M1
= 5 and N = 20
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Fig. 6. ODEs of Communication Cost Option 4
model, r=w=1, s=0.1, d = 1, t = 0.01, M2 =
5 and N = 20
mance noticeably better than the option 1 with a slow rate of the transferData, i.e.
d = 0.01. The model reaches its steady state in a much shorter time in comparison
with the option 1. Doubling the private clouds instances to be 10 (Figure 8) makes
the model much faster to perform 20 workflows simultaneously. Nevertheless, it is
obvious that the performance of the option 4 model is limited by the Service3.
Figures 9 – 12 show the performance of option 1 and option 4 models for 2000
workflows under ODE analysis. The comparison between these two options (1 and
4 ) shows that option 1 takes more time to reach the steady state, because it is
significantly affected by the slow rate of the transferData action, where the most
population concentrates at Service3 (analyse) action, as seen in Figure 9. Moreover,
it is worth noting that doubling the number of public clouds to be 10 in Figure 11
initially shifts the bottleneck of the system to the Service2 (anonymise) action and
the steady state is reached very rapidly; which is not the case for the option 4
(Figure 12). In the option 1 making the rate of anaymise faster, e.g. s = 1, the
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Fig. 7. ODEs of Communication Cost Op-
tion 1 model, using assump. 2 from Table 1,
t = 0.01,M1 = 10 and N = 20
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Fig. 8. ODEs of Communication Cost Option 4
model, r=w=1, s=0.1, d = 1, t = 0.01, M2 =
10 and N = 20
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Fig. 9. ODEs of Communication Cost Op-
tion 1 model, using assump. 2 from Table 1,
t = 0.01,M1 = 5 and N = 2000
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Fig. 10. ODEs of Communication Cost Option
4 model, r=w=1, s=0.1, d = 1, t = 0.01, M2 =
5 and N = 2000
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Fig. 11. ODEs of Communication Cost Op-
tion 1 model, using assump. 2 from Table 1,
t = 0.01,M1 = 10 and N = 2000
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Fig. 12. ODEs of Communication Cost Option
4 model, r=w=1, s=0.1, d = 1, t = 0.01, M2 =
10 and N = 2000
bottleneck moves back to Service3.
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Fig. 13. ODEs of Communication Cost Option
1 model, using assump. 1 from Table 1, M1 = 5
and N = 20
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Fig. 14. ODEs of Communication Cost Option
1 model, using assump. 4 from Table 1, M1 = 5
and N = 20
5.3 Comparison of slow and fast rates of Option 1
In this section, the behaviour of option 1 will be examined further by means of
comparing the low rate and the high rate of the data transfer delay. Here we
consider two extreme values of the range of communication costs. The aim is to
find out how the communication cost will impact the performance of option 1. The
comparison will include two sets of experiments using ODE analysis, where the
system has 20 workflows and then 2000 workflows respectively.
Figure 13 and Figure 15 illustrate the transient behaviour of the Option 1 model
using assumption 1 of Table 1, 5 and 10 public cloud instances and 20 workflows.
The population of Service2 in Figure 13 takes about 85% of the number of workflows
then decreases steadily to reach 25% with the increase of the population of Service3.
However, by doubling the number of public clouds to be 10 as shown in Figure 15,
Service3 declined by 25% of the previous population, and also, Service2 has raised
and the steady state is reached quicker than the use of 5 public clouds. Increasing
the rate of the transferData to be 1000 times faster as exhibited in Figure 14 and
Figure 16, the system reaches steady state rapidly. Increasing the number of public
clouds has no effect on the model behaviour, this is because of the relatively fast
rate of the transferData action, meaning that the extra resources are not utilised.
Figures 17 – 20 illustrate the system evolution when the number of workflows
is 2000. Although different parameters are used, the figures show near identical
behaviour, with only a small difference in Figure 17 and Figure 19 where the data
transfer rate is assigned a slower value. Nonetheless, this does not significantly affect
the performance of the model. Increasing the number of public clouds instances has
no effect on the performance because most of the population accumulates at the
Service1 and Service3 (anonymise and analyse) actions respectively, since these
services limit the performance of the model as they have comparatively slow rates.
To sum up, the comparisons of slow and fast rates of the option 1 have shown
that the use of the fast rate for the transferData action will result in similar perfor-
mance provided by different deployment options (public and private). For example,
Figure 10 of option 4 in comparison against the Figure 18 of option 1. The popula-
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Fig. 15. ODEs of Communication Cost Option
1 model, using assump. 1 of Table 1, M1 = 10
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Fig. 16. ODEs of Communication Cost Option
1 model, using assump. 4 of Table 1, M1 = 10
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Fig. 17. ODEs of Communication Cost Option
1 model, using assump. 1 of Table 1, M1 = 5
and N = 2000
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Fig. 18. ODEs of Communication Cost Option
1 model, using assump. 4 of Table 1, M1 = 5
and N = 2000
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Fig. 19. ODEs of Communication Cost Option
1 model, using assump. 1 of Table 1, M1 = 10
and N = 2000
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Fig. 20. ODEs of Communication Cost Option
1 model, using assump. 4 of Table 1, M1 = 10
and N = 2000
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tion of both figures are extremely similar, although steady state is reached faster in
the option 4. That is because in the case of option 1 there are two services (read-
Data and anonymise) that have been deployed on only one private server, which
leads to more initial load.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a methodology for investigating the cost of data
transfer delay on the cloud computing using the Markovian Process Algebra PEPA.
We have extended our previous work [8] with the intention to examine the commu-
nication costs of two different security deployment options on public and private
clouds. We have considered the communications cost through adding some network
delays between actions being undertaken in different public and private deploy-
ments. Although, the presented model is simple, it can still provide insight into the
behaviour of the system.
The comparison between option 1 (public) and option 4 (private), has shown
that at a small scale system the performance of option 4 is identical to the option 1,
specifically, by the use of relatively high rate for the transferData action in option
1 ; which means that the latter option is still cost effective. Nevertheless, for a larger
scale system if we used a slow rate in the option 1 the results have illustrated that
option 4 is offering better performance, due to the data transfer cost that overloaded
the option 1. Increasing the rate of data transfer in option 1 has noticeably risen
the performance and presented behaviour which is similar to the option 4. The
obtained outcomes have shown that the models are able to provide a prediction
of the steady state for the given systems while considering different rates for the
communication.
However, there are clearly some limitations, for example the presented work has
not been validated against real implementation, which would clearly be beneficial.
As stated, we have not considered data transfer delay cost to be subject to network
contention, which may be the case when there are simultaneous large data transfers
between domains. Modelling such behaviour would show a bigger impact on the
data transfer when there is a mixed use of public and private clouds and may lead
to alternative workflows being more attractive, for example using compression on
large data sets.
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